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The Bandung Ethic and International Human Rights
Practice
Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow
obiora chinedu okafor*
introduction
Between April 18 and 24, 1955, a group of twenty-nine African and Asian states
gathered in Bandung, Indonesia, for the very first Afro-Asian summit in
recorded human history.1 Almost every single African and Asian state that
was independent at the time was represented at Bandung.2 It is no wonder
then that this moment is widely regarded in the literature as “the foundational
moment of the Third World.”3 Issued on April 24, 1955, the Conference’s
Final Communiqué4 captured what I refer to in this chapter as the Bandung
ethic. This conference also inspired a long line of subsequent meetings of the
same kind and heralded the emergence of a relatively new political and
socioeconomic movement in world affairs5 – one that eventually included
Latin American and the Caribbean states.6 The nonaligned movement and
the Group of 77 states (or the G-77) represent differing (though related) forms,
dimensions, and iterations of this broad movement.7
* I am grateful to Herman Gill for his excellent research assistance.
1 See The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia (ed.), “Final Communiqué of
the Asian-African Conference of Bandung (April 24, 1955),” Asia-Africa Speak from Bandung,
pp. 161–169.
2 See G.M. Kahin, The Afro-Asian Conference: Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955 (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1956), p. 1.
3 See R. Burke, “The Compelling Dialogue of Freedom: Human Rights at the Bandung
Conference” 28 Human Rights Quarterly 947 (2006), p. 948.
4 Ibid. 5 See Kahin, “The Afro-Asian Conference,” p. 2.
6 See R. Abdulgani, The Bandung Connection (Singapore: Gunung Agung, 1981), pp. v–vi.
7 Ibid. Regarding the Non-Aligned Movement, see the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM),
www.nam.gov.za (accessed June 26, 2014); and S. Morphet, “Multilateralism and the Non-
Aligned Movement: What Is the Global South Doing and Where Is It Going?” 10 Global
Governance 517 (2004). On the G-77, see www.g-77.org (accessed June 26, 2014); and
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Although the Bandung Conference took place several decades ago, some
would maintain nevertheless that its spirit is not yet dead – that it remains as
relevant as ever today.8 Not everyone might fully agree, but whether or not the
Bandung spirit is now yesterday’s affair, it is important to inquire whether the
nature of the inspirations and motivations behind the convening of Bandung,
the particular modes of struggle favored at that conference, and the specific
outcomes of that historic meeting suggest anything to us about the character
and orientation of international human rights practice today, as compared to
yesterday? Has that practice changed at all since and as a result of Bandung,
and if so, to what degree? Has it aligned to any extent with what might be
styled the Bandung ethic? From the perspective of what Bandung appears to
have represented to the bulk of those who convened that meeting, and from
the point of departure of the Bandung ethic, are there any continuities or
discontinuities from international human rights practice’s past that leap to the
eye when one trains one’s gaze on that practice today? Has everything
remained more or less the same today with international human rights
practice in spite of Bandung and the broad ethic it pushed to the fore of
global relations? Or has anything changed significantly as a result?
These related questions are especially relevant and important since “human
rights” was, so to speak, present at Bandung.9 Given this fact, it makes sense
that a book such as the current one, devoted as it partly is to the relationship
between Bandung and international law, pay some attention to the relation-
ship of the Bandung ethic to the character and orientation of international
human rights practice today.
It should also be noted that much of the contents of this book does
constitute a timely and important addition to the critical Third World
approaches to international law (TWAIL) literature on Bandung. For, if
Makau Mutua is correct that critical TWAIL scholars like many of the
contributors to this book “stand on the shoulders of Bandung,”10 then it is
also appropriate that these scholars reflect systematically and publicly in this
way on Bandung, its spirit, and its broad ethic.
In a bid to achieve its objectives, the chapter is organized into five parts,
this introduction included. In the second section, the meaning, character,
M. Martin, “The Group of Seventy-seven (G77) and a Third World Secretariat” 75
Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 220 (1986).
8 See Abdulgani, Bandung Connection, pp. 1–8.
9 See Burke, “Compelling Dialogue,” p. 948.
10 See M. Mutua, “What is TWAIL?” 94 American Society of International Law 31 (2004),
pp. 33–34.
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and orientation of the Bandung ethic are explored in the hopes of arriving at
a working understanding of that concept. The third section discusses the
continuities that might leap to the trained eye in the character and workings
of international human rights, despite the emergence decades before now of
the Bandung ethic and its propagation and circulation in international
relations since then. In the fourth section, the discontinuities that have
characterized international human rights practice since, and (partly) as a
result of, the propagation and circulation of the Bandung ethic are exam-
ined.11 The fifth section ends the chapter by offering a few concluding
remarks.
the bandung ethic
Given the nature of the overarching goals of this chapter, it is important at this
juncture to develop a working understanding of the expression “the Bandung
ethic.” This is necessary if our discussion, in subsequent sections of the
chapter, of the relationship between that concept and contemporary inter-
national human right practice is to make sense.
Some insight into aspects of what this expression, as it is used in this
chapter, might denote, is offered in Fouad Ajami’s decades-old conclusion
that “the men [and women] who met in Bandung were dreamers . . . who
wanted their societies to enter the world on more equitable terms.”12 The key
word here is equity, which in turn invokes the concept of equality (all on a
global scale).13 And an aspect of this ethic of global equality that was central to
the motivations and outcomes of the Bandung Conference was the insistence
on the part of the Afro-Asian states there gathered on the agency of their
peoples (whatever the gap between state and society in these countries), on
charting their own courses, on finding their own ways, and on the preservation
of their newfound autonomy and independence (howsoever porous and
illusory these later turned out to be).14
It is no wonder then that, as testified to by both its communiqué and studies
of its proceedings, in addition to some other issues and concerns that were on
11 Space constraints do not allow for a full analysis of the relationship between the Bandung ethic
and the international human rights practice today. Only systematic and illustrative sketches of
some of these relationships are developed.
12 See F. Ajami, “The Fate of Nonalignment” 59 Foreign Affairs 366 (1980–1981), p. 368.
13 For a discussion of the concept of global (in)equality, see, e.g., T. Pogge, “An Egalitarian Law
of Peoples” 23 Philosophy and Public Affairs 195 (1994).
14 See The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Final Communiqué.”
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the mind of participating delegations,15 the Conference considered and held
vital issues related to imperialism. This included issues such as the following:
colonialism (which at the time was still being experienced almost everywhere
in its bare-knuckle forms); self-determination (which stood normatively
opposed to colonialism); neocolonialism (which even then had begun to
trouble not a few of these countries); South-South cooperation (a necessary
bulwark against what was considered by many as the socioeconomic and
political tyranny of the great powers); sovereignty/nonintervention (seen as a
normative defense against undue outside manipulation and control); and
respect for fundamental human rights (howsoever differently contemplated
by the various delegations there represented).16
It is also no wonder then that, as others have noted, “Bandung [also]
signaled a refusal to accept the bipolar scheme, to join the superpower
competition, or subscribe to either of the mutually exclusive ideologies on
which that competition rested.”17 This was the stance that was later on
christened “non-alignment.”18
With regard to those aspects of the discussions, deliberations, and consensus
at Bandung that were explicitly framed in human rights terms, it is important
to underline some of the disagreements that were present at that meeting over
questions of the proper conception and practice of human rights. Behind the
Communiqué’s broad and “full support of the fundamental principles of
human rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations”19 and the fact
that it “took note of the universal declaration of Human Rights as a common
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations,”20 there was some
variation in the true attitudes of some delegations to these questions. For
example, it is clear that [then] Communist China could hardly have sub-
scribed fully to this very strong universalist approach, at least not at the relevant
time, and many other Afro-Asian states (such as Singapore and Malaysia)
would later reject this strong universalism, albeit to varying extents. Of course,
15 As, for example, the shadow that Communist China supposedly set over Asia. See D. Kimche,
The Afro-Asian Movement: Ideology and Foreign Policy of the Third World (New York: Praeger,
1966), p. 59.
16 See The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Final Communiqué’. See also http://franke.uchicago.
edu/Final_Communique_Bandung_1955.pdf (accessed June 27, 2014); and G.H. Jansen,
Nonalignment and the Afro-Asian States (New York: Praeger, 1966), Appendix A.4, p. 419. See
also Kahin, The Afro-Asian Conference, p. 1.
17 See H.W. Brands, The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third
World, 1947–1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), p. 3.
18 See Ajami, “Fate of Nonalignment.”
19 See The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Final Communiqué,” Section C, pp. 5–6.
20 Ibid. See also Burke, “Compelling Dialogue,” p. 952.
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almost needless to say, the issue of the actual human rights practice of states
has always been a whole other matter, not just in the Third World but the
world over as well.21 And so the tension between the universality and relativity
of human rights (in almost all its shades) was present at Bandung, however
subtly.
At Bandung, Third World unity and South-South cooperation were con-
ceived in terms of “the ethic of solidarity.”22 Even since then, these particular
notions of unity and cooperation have remained key modes of the anti-
imperialist and pro–Third World struggle. This approach was inspired by
the work of great anti-imperialist theoreticians such as Amilcar Cabral, who
once declared that, “we consider that unity is a means but not an end.”23
Importantly, such an attempt at forging unity among the generally weaker
Third World states did not proceed in ignorance of the fact of great diversity
among Afro-Asian peoples and states, let alone in the entire geopolitical
South. Indeed, it proceeded precisely because of that diversity. The fact that
“Afro-Asia [let alone the entire Third World] provides a vast canvas to paint, so
vast, indeed, that individual details tend to blur and become indistinct,”24 and
that the diversity of the Third World was more or less on display at Bandung,25
should not lead inexorably to the conclusion that there was no political
solidarity on display at Bandung.26 In any case, this should not make us reject
the possibility of such solidarity manifesting in undulating fashion, in ebbs and
flows, depending on the issue and the context.27 For, the vast majority of Afro-
Asian (and Third World) peoples – and their states – almost always have
enough common concerns to almost always ensure that such solidarity is
achieved. The overall point here then is that to the extent that the Bandung
21 See O.C. Okafor and S.C. Agbakwa, “Re-Imagining International Human Rights Education in
Our Time: Beyond Three Constitutive Orthodoxies” 14 Leiden Journal of International Law
563 (2001), pp. 566–73. See also M. Mutua, “Savages, Victims and Saviors: The Metaphor of
Human Rights” 42 Harvard International Law Journal 201 (2001); Baxi, The Future of Human
Rights; U. Baxi, “‘A Work in Progress’?: The United States’ Report to the United Nations’
Human Rights Committee” 35 Indian Journal of International Law 34 (1995); U. Baxi,
“Random Reflections on the [Im]possibility of Human Rights,” www.pdhre.org/dialogue/
reflections.html (accessed October 30, 2013); and P. Houtondji, “The Master’s Voice –
Remarks on the Problem of Human Rights in Africa” in UNESCO, Philosophical Foundations
of Human Rights (Paris: UNESCO, 1986), pp. 320–332.
22 See Kimche, Afro-Asian Movement, p. v.
23 See A. Cabral, Unite et Lutte, II (1975), pp. 226–231, reproduced in P. Braillard and M.-R.
Djalili, The Third World and International Relations (London: Frances Pinter, 1984), p. 36.
24 See Kimche, Afro-Asian Movement, p. v. 25 Ibid, pp. 66–67. 26 Ibid, pp. 73–74.
27 See R. P. Anand, “Attitude of the Asian-African States toward Certain Problems of
International Law” 15 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 55 (1966).
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ethic encompasses an aspect of solidarity, that aspect is not illusory and should
factor in some way into any analysis of Bandung and its effects on world affairs.
Thus, in sum, the Bandung ethic weaves together the aspects of anti-
imperialism, independence, agency, global equality, respect for fundamental
human rights (whatever the diversity in its conception at the Conference), the
uplifting of the material, political, and even psychological conditions of Afro-
Asian peoples, and Third World solidarity. Yet, the dominant strain within this
ethic is one of global equality, Third World independences/agencies, and the
improvement of the conditions of Third World peoples.
continuities
To what extent has international human rights practice remained impervious
over time to the dictates of this broad Bandung ethic? To what extent has that
discipline resisted successfully the changes that should have occurred if it were
to imbibe, internalize, and be firmly oriented toward the Bandung ethic?
Have continuities marked (and even marred) the discipline in spite of the
circulation and projection since 1955 of the Bandung ethic? While space
constraints do not allow a full treatment of these questions here, the consider-
ation of a few examples of the kinds of continuities referred to above will
suffice to illustrate the position.
First, international human rights practice is (with ebbs and flows) still as
captive today as it was at the time of the Bandung Conference to what might
be referred to as the Western (and great power) super-gaze (i.e., the gaze of the
dominant elements in the West). With rare exceptions such as apartheid and
perhaps the dumping of toxic waste, what even gets to be viewed and named
in the dominant discourse as a human right violation, what gets assigned that
consequential appellation, has been disproportionately (though not totally)
shaped by Western opinion and imprimatur. And even when the struggle to
style certain conduct a human rights violation has been initiated or led by one
of more Third World states (such as African states in relation to apartheid and
the dumping of toxic waste), without the imprimatur of the strongest Western
states (who constitute a tiny percentage of the number of states in the world
and house a relatively puny number of the world’s population), that struggle
has tended to face a huge – and sometimes insurmountable – obstacle to its
success.28 In spite of the undulating but persistent projection of the Bandung
28 See, e.g., A. Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1995); and C.U. Gwam, Toxic Waste and Human Rights
(Bloomington: Authorhouse, 2010).
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ethic in global relations by many forces (states, groups such as the G-77,
peoples, social movements, NGOs, and so on), little has changed in this
regard. In the circumstances, the only reasonable explanation for this kind
of relative stasis in the character and orientation of international human rights
practice is the vastly disproportionate global power that is wielded by these
most powerful Western states, peoples, and groups (where “power” is seen not
merely in military, economic, and political terms, but also in ideational and
social senses).
A recent demonstration of the ways in which the exertion of such global
power has tended to work in the period between Bandung and today to almost
pervert our vision of social reality and shape what gets viewed as a human
rights violation, is the difference in the ways in which the crushing of protests
in Egypt and the Ukraine has been received in the dominant (and especially,
the popular) human rights discourse. The Egyptian Army (led by a general
considered to be friendly to the West) brutally crushes a peaceful sit-in and in
the process kills hundreds of clearly peaceful Islamists who were protesting
what is by any reasonable measure a military coup against the freely elected
but Islamist Morsi government, and this massacre is followed, at best, by a
whimper of protest, and largely by equivocation and ambivalence, in official
and mass media circles, as well as within civil society itself, in the most
powerful Western countries.29 But when the Ukrainian police under the
Victor Yanukovich government (considered unfriendly to the West) storms a
more or less peaceful protest in Kiev, with comparatively far less casualties, a
deluge of Western leaders’, civil society and mass media voices is raised in the
loudest possible decibels, with very little or no equivocation or ambivalence,
against this “outrage on human rights.”30 To be sure, some in Western and
non-Western civil society did condemn both incidents (whatever the differ-
ences in their intensity and sincerity),31 but the more powerful of the Western
29 See, e.g., “Kerry Says Egypt Military Was ‘Restoring Democracy’ in Ousting Morsi,” New York
Times (Aug. 1, 2013), www.nytimes.com/2013/08/02/world/middleeast/egypt-warns-morsi-
supporters-to-end-protests.html?_r=0 (accessed July 4, 2014); and “Violent Crackdown
in Egypt Crushes Hope for Political Reconciliation,” Globe and Mail (Aug. 14, 2013),
www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/violent-crackdown-in-egypt-crushes-hope-for-political-
reconciliation/article13778066/ (accessed July 4, 2014).
30 See, e.g., “Ukraine Forces Retreat ceding Square to Protests,” New York Times (Dec. 11, 2013),
www.nytimes.com/2013/12/12/world/europe/police-storm-kiev-square-as-crisis-grows.html?
pagewanted=all (accessed July 4, 2014); and “World Leaders Condemn Ukraine Bloodshed,”
Time (Feb. 19, 2014), http://world.time.com/2014/02/19/world-leaders-condemn-ukraine-
bloodshed/ (accessed July 4, 2014).
31 See, e.g., the recent report by Amnesty International on the serious and widespread human
rights violations by the new el Sissi regime in Egypt, which is essentially the same regime that
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leaders and mass media, and the bulk of civil society, tended to exhibit the
kind of bias outlined above. To the discerning mind, this should exemplify the
ways in which the Western super gaze plays a disproportionately powerful role
in shaping the living international human rights discourse and practice. The
gaze of the less powerful agents in our largely hierarchical world did not really
matter all that much here, and is almost completely displaced by the super
gaze of the most powerful Western agents.
A related continuity in the character and orientation of international
human rights practice is that, despite the insistence at Bandung (and since
then) on global equality, Third World agency and anti-imperialism, that
practice is still virtually as unidirectional in flow as it was at the time of
Bandung. As has been argued elsewhere, international human rights practice
(past and present) has tended to be defined by a one-way traffic paradigm in
which human rights knowledge, scrutiny, and supervision tend to flow from
those parts of the world, largely the West (which supposedly invented human
rights, know almost everything about it already, and observe it almost to the
letter), in the direction of those regions of the world, largely the Third World
(which apparently did not invent human rights, which tend to know very
little – if anything – about it, and which hardly ever observe its tenets).32 It has
also been pointed out in support of this argument that international human
rights programs and clinics in North America tend to focus heavily on the
Third World and not on their own region;33 and that the United States – at
one extreme – rarely thinks of itself as a proper candidate for human rights
scrutiny.34
As importantly, it is noteworthy that in spite of the aspect of solidarity that
co-constitutes the broad Bandung ethic, South-South (i.e., intra–Third
World) human rights cooperation, be it ideational or practical, is still in its
youth today, and has not grown nearly as much as might have been expected
crushed the peaceful sit-ins of the Islamists. See “Egypt ‘Failing at Every Level’ of Human
Rights,” BBC News (July 3, 2014), www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28147913 (accessed
July 4, 2014).
32 See Okafor, “Re-Imagining International Human Rights.” See also M. Mutua, “Savages,
Victims and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights” 42 Harvard International Law Journal
201 (2001); U. Baxi, The Future of Human Rights; Baxi, “Work in Progress”; Baxi, “Random
Reflections”; and Houtondji, “The Master’s Voice,” 320–332.
33 See T. Ezer and S. Deller Ross, “Fact-Finding as a Lawmaking Tool for Advancing Women’s
Human Rights” 7 Georgetown Journal of Gender & Law 331 (2006), p. 331; and J. Bond,
“Global Classroom: International Human Rights Fact-Finding as Clinical Method,” 28
William Mitchell Law Review 317 (2001), pp. 320–324. For a critique of this tendency, see
Okafor, “Re-Imagining International Human Rights,” pp. 566–583.
34 Baxi, “Work in Progress.”
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by those who foresaw the imperative and promise of Third World unity at
Bandung, as a bulwark against the overall rapaciousness of the global power
environment. This is a startling continuity since the Bandung era in the
inability of the Third World to muster as common a front as is possible (their
main means of effective resistance) against the domination of international
human rights practice by the most powerful Western states. To be sure,
continuous efforts at South-South human rights cooperation have been made,
and have even succeeded at times (e.g., in pushing the anticolonial, anti-
apartheid, anti–toxic waste, anti–unilateral sanctions agendas through the UN
Human Rights Council).35 But these efforts are nowhere near their optimal,
and are in fact closer to the Bandung baseline for assessment than to their
optimal point. While here is not the place to discuss the reasons for the
existence of this wide gap, suffice it to note that the propagation and circula-
tion of the Bandung ethic has not, thus far, led to the optimization of the
practical forms of human rights solidarity that is possible among Third World
countries and their peoples. It is no wonder then that a recent Report of the
UN Human Rights Council Advisory Committee has called for much greater
efforts to be made in the direction of South-South human rights
cooperation.36
Another feature (or perhaps orientation) of international human rights
practice that has persisted in spite of the Bandung ethic is that to the extent
that it sets out to help author the wiping out of global impoverishment and
material want, the geographic focus of this aspect of its work has hardly shifted.
This is largely because what Upendra Baxi has mellifluously styled the “geog-
raphies of injustice”37 has remained more or less stable in the sixty years or so
since the Bandung conference. By this is meant the fact that the vast majority
of the extremely “impoverished” and “deprived” peoples of this world still
inhabit a broad geographic zone that closely maps onto the territories in which
the vast majority of the poor people lived at the time of the Bandung
conference. This has been so notwithstanding the huge gains made since
Bandung in the area of the alleviation of extreme poverty in countries like
China and Brazil, and despite the similar but much less dramatic rising tides
in some other Third World countries. This level of geographic continuity in
35 See, e.g., Klotz, Norms in International Relations; and Gwam, Toxic Waste.
36 See Preliminary Study of the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee on the Enhancement
of International Cooperation in the Field of Human Rights, A/HRC/AC/12/CRP.2 (June 2014),
section vi.
37 See U. Baxi, “Operation Enduring Freedom: Toward a New International Law and Order?” in
A. Anghie, B. Chimni, K. Mickelson, and O. Okafor (eds.), The Third World and International
Order: Law, Politics and Globalization (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2003), p. 46.
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the incidence of extreme poverty is simply indisputable. At the very least, such
Third World–centered global socioeconomic inequality remains “as acute as
ever.”38
A related continuity in international human rights practice since Bandung
is that economic and social (ES) rights remain more or less marginalized
today in the relevant texts, discourses, and practices, in spite of the Bandung
ethic’s insistence on global socioeconomic equity and the uplifting of the
material conditions of Third World peoples. The fuller enjoyment of ES
rights is of course an important, if not minimum, condition for the elimin-
ation of extreme poverty. Now, the extent of the marginalization of ES rights
has of course lessened in the time between Bandung and today, in part as a
result of the struggles of both Third World and like-minded states/activists/
peoples.39 For instance, ES rights are now justiciable within the legal systems
of a number of countries, such as South Africa40; the African Commission
on Human and Peoples’ Rights has issued a number of forward-looking
decisions which take ES rights very seriously41; the Court of Justice of the
Economic Community of West African States has acted similarly42; the UN
Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights has worked assiduously
to bridge the conceptual gap between civil/political (CP) rights and ES rights
(including through innovations such as the concept of minimum core
obligations)43; and UN documents now consistently proclaim the equality,
indivisibility, and interdependence of all categories of human rights.44 Yet,
even the mere fact that only a relatively small number of countries have
thought it fit to place ES rights on the same footing as CP rights in their
constitutions is most telling as to the continued marginalization of ES rights
in our time.45
Lastly, given the strong pro-autonomy/agency and anti-imperialist streak of
the Bandung ethic, it is significant that in all-too-many cases (if not in almost
all cases), the framework (and not necessarily the details) of the socioeconomic
and political policies of Third World states still tend to be directed from
outside their borders, usually by one or more of the most powerful Western
states, or by some institution under their effective collective direction and
38 See Ajami, “Fate of Nonalignment.”
39 See P. Alston and R. Goodman, International Human Rights (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2012).
40 Ibid.
41 See, e.g., Social and Economic Rights Action Centre v. Nigeria (referred to as the Ogoni Case),
15th Activity Report 2001–2002, Annex V.
42 See, e.g., SERAP v. Nigeria, Suit No. ECW/CCJ/APP/0808 (on the right to education).
43 See Alston, International Human Rights. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid.
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control.46 This has remained so, with ebbs and flows, since and in spite of
Bandung, and despite the flow of much smaller, intra–Third World counter-
currents such as the rise of China to a significant measure of global power47;
Chinese influence across the Third World (especially on the African contin-
ent)48; a more modest measure of Indian economic influence around the
world49; the subregional sway of Nigeria in West Africa50; the rise of South
Africa to a modest measure of regional economic power51; and the open
resistance of some Third World states (such as Venezuela) to such great power
influence at one or more points in their existence.52 Kwame Nkrumah, one of
the great anti-imperialist theorists once wrote that
the essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in
theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international
sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is
directed from the outside . . . Neo-Colonialism is also the worst form of
imperialism. For those who practice it, it means power without responsibility
and for those who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress.53
Given this time-hallowed and accurate definition, it becomes fairly clear from
the above discussion that sixty years or so after Bandung, almost all of the
Third World peoples are – to varying degrees – still in the throes of neocolo-
nialism. It is no wonder that former UN Assistant Secretary-General Sashi
Tharoor recently warned that it would be most mistaken even today to
46 See, e.g., O.C. Okafor, “Re-Conceiving ‘Third World’ Legitimate Governance Struggles in
Our Time: Emergent Imperatives for Rights Activism” 6 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 1
(2000).
47 See D. Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2013).
48 See, e.g., A.C. Alves, “China’s ‘Win-Win’ Cooperation: Unpacking the Impact of
Infrastructure for Resources Deals in Africa” 20 South African Journal of International Affairs
207 (2013).
49 See D. Wagner and D. Jackman, “China and India’s Battle for Influence in Asia,” The
Huffington Post, www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-wagner/china-and-indias-battle-f_b_833371.
html (accessed July 4, 2014).
50 See CNN, “Nigeria: West Africa’s Economic Powerhouse” (Sept. 27, 2010), www.cnn.com/
2010/WORLD/africa/09/17/nigeria.country.profile/; and BBC News, “How Nigeria has
Affected the Rest of Africa” (Sept. 20, 2010), www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-11429067
(accessed July 4, 2014).
51 See IMF Survey Magazine (Oct. 25, 2012), www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2012/
car102412a.htm (accessed July 4, 2014).
52 See, e.g., The Guardian (Feb. 18, 2006), www.theguardian.com/world/2006/feb/18/usa.
venezuela (accessed July 4, 2014).
53 See K. Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (London: Thomas Nelson,
1965), p. xi.
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discount “the messy afterlife of colonialism” in our study of and reactions to
international relations.54
These are some of the ways in which international human rights practice
has remained impervious to the dictates of the Bandung ethic, and resisted
successfully the changes that should have occurred if that practice were to
imbibe, internalize, and be firmly oriented toward that ethic.
discontinuities55
Having established in the last section that, despite the propagation and
circulation of the Bandung ethic over the last sixty or so years, there is a
significant measure of continuity even until this day in the nature and
orientation of international human rights practice, the question that remains
is whether there has been significant changes or alterations in the character or
orientation of international human rights practice, or in the major tasks that
confront it, since and because of Bandung? While there have, of course, been
a number of such alterations, not all of them may be viewed as positive from
the point of view of Third World states/peoples. And here again, space
constraints dictate that only a number of them will be discussed.
One of the more noticeable changes that have occurred since, and in part
because of, Bandung is an important alteration in the nature of the major task
that confronts international human rights practice. Formal colonialism has
been delegitimized and the blatant forms of that institution have suffered near-
total eradication in real life. Except for Palestine, the Western Sahara, and
perhaps two or three other places, it would be extremely difficult to find
formal colonialism anywhere in the world today. Fouad Ajami was correct is
pointing this out in 1981, and Sashi Taroor was even more justified in
announcing it about two decades later.56 In any case, this is now so obviously
a truism that its adumbration should not detain us here. Suffice it to say that
even mere formal independence has had its benefits for Third World states
and peoples, and has helped reshape the list of major tasks that confront
international human rights practice. With a few exceptions, formal colonial-
ism – an egregious human rights violation – is no longer one of these tasks.
54 See S. Tharoor, “The Messy Afterlife of Colonialism” 8 Global Governance 1 (2002).
55 A small portion of this section is taken from O.C. Okafor, “On the Patchiness, Promise and
Perils of ‘Global’ Human Rights Law,” Diaspora Scholars Lecture, Nigerian Institute of
Advanced Legal Studies (2011), pp. 41–43.
56 See Ajami, “Fate of Nonalignment,” p. 368; and Tharoor, “Messy Afterlife.”
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What is more, this huge alteration in the level of unacceptability of formal
colonialism has meant that global power (howsoever stable, morphed, or
transformed) is today not nearly as free as it was at the time of the Bandung
Conference to write international human rights texts or author international
human rights practice. Global power must now contend with one or two new
Third World power centers,57 as well as with the emergence into formal
international life of nearly two hundred (Third World) states with a tendency
to dominate the membership of many (though clearly not all) of the bodies
that write the relevant texts and author the related practice.58 This situation
has helped alter the global power matrices within which international human
rights practice must circulate and operate, and reorient that practice itself
(however modestly) toward greater alignment with the Bandung ethic. Global
power must now also contend with the existence and activities of peoples’
movements in the Global South and the transnational networks they have
sometimes formed to leverage forms of Western civil society influence in the
service of Third World goals (e.g., the anti–land mines and anti-damn
movements).59
Another way in which the global power matrices that help shape the
content and orientation of international human rights practice, and against
which that practice often operates, have altered significantly in the period
between Bandung and the present is through a socioeconomic and political
development that is largely internal to the Third World itself.60 The rise to a
measure of global socioeconomic and political influence (however limited) of
57 For example, the rise of China has altered many global political and socioeconomic
calculations. See Shambaugh, China Goes Global.
58 For example, although sponsored by Russia, the study conducted by the Human Rights
Council Advisory Committee (HRCAC) on the highly controversial issue of “Promoting
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms through a Better Understanding of Traditional
Values of Humankind,” pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution A/HRC/RES/16/3 of
April 8, 2011, was largely pushed through by the large Third World majority on the UN Human
Rights Council. While the necessity for this study appeared to make a lot of sense to almost all
Third World states and some others, it was opposed to varying degrees by most Western
countries and most Western NGOs. The HRCAC’s Report on this study is documented as UN
Doc. A/HRC/22/71, of Dec. 6, 2012.
59 See, e.g., B. Rajagopal, International Law from Below (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003); and M. Cameron, To Walk without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban
Landmines (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 1998).
60 This is an internal Third World development for the most part because, aside from Russia, all
the countries that are exerting significant power and all the countries against which power is
being exerted continue to identify with the Third World (either as part of the Non-Aligned
Movement and/or the G-77).
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the “BRICS” (i.e., Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa),61 and the
more recent and less robust emergence of the MINTs (i.e., Mexico, Indo-
nesia, Nigeria, and Turkey),62 has led to the concretization in our time of
newer global human rights battlefronts, newer axes of power along which both
familiar and unfamiliar human rights axes will increasingly be ground. When
the Chinese build factories or mine crude oil in parts of Africa,63 or Nigerian
banks dominate much of the West African and East African markets,64 labor
and other human rights issues are triggered across a power divide that, though
not quite as acutely asymmetrical as the North-South one, is still significantly
so. While these kinds of relationships have always existed within the Third
World, they have never been as acute as they are today or are likely to become
in the near to mid-term. So, there is a sense in which the albeit limited success
of the project of South-South socioeconomic cooperation that was, under-
standably, favored so strongly at Bandung has produced its own pathology,
created new global fronts in the struggle for human rights, and triggered the
shift of some human rights struggles from a predominantly North-South to
certain South-South axes. Critical Third World international human rights
scholars will do well to pay greater attention to these developments.
Another change that has occurred in international human rights practice
since, and in part as a result of, Bandung is the significant augmentation of the
capacity of Third World states, civil society groups and peoples to “discipline”
global power and influence the behavior of the stronger states that has
occurred. Human rights languages are being increasingly harnessed by the
weaker Third World states as they have sought, sometimes with significant
success, to “discipline” the behavior of the stronger states.65 They have sought
to make the stronger states internalize certain values, and reorient their
61 See W. Dan, “Common Development Strategies for Asian and Latin American Developing
Countries: From the Perspective of Foreign Trade” 4 Journal of International Commercial Law
and Technology 143 (2009).
62 See “The Mint Countries: Next Economic Giants?” BBC News (Jan. 5, 2014), www.bbc.com/
news/magazine-25548060 (accessed July 4, 2014).
63 See C. Alessi and S. Hanson, “Expanding China-Africa Oil Tie,” Council of Foreign Relations
Backgrounder (Feb. 8, 2012), www.cfr.org/china/expanding-china-africa-oil-ties/p9557
(accessed July 4, 2014).
64 See D. O’Neil, “Nigerian Banks Battle for Pan-African Dominance,” Euromoney (Apr. 2013),
www.euromoney.com/Article/3181918/Nigerian-banks-battle-for-pan-African-dominance.htm
(accessed July 4, 2014).
65 Here the word discipline is used in a Foucaldian sense. To Foucault, “Discipline ‘makes’
individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals both as objects and as
instruments of its exercise. It is not a triumphant power...it is a modest, suspicious power,
which functions as a calculated, but permanent economy.” See M. Foucault, Discipline and
Punish: The Birth of the Prison (London: Allen Lane, 1977)
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conduct accordingly – even if not completely. Sensing the hold that human
rights languages now seem to have over the mentalities of the leaders and
peoples of many of these (largely) Western states, Third World states, move-
ments, and NGOs have for long framed and couched in human rights terms
many of the issues that are important to them and, many at time, their
peoples.66 They have also placed many of those issues on the human rights
agenda of various UN organs, such as the General Assembly, the Human
Rights Council, and the Commission on Human Rights (the predecessor of
the second body).67 Thus, this increased capacity of international human
rights practice to provide a way in which weaker states, peoples, and NGOs
can seek (however modestly) to project their more important ethical, equity,
and other concerns is yet another way in which that practice has changed in
the intervening years since 1955. While these developments may not be easily
or entirely attributable to the circulation and effect of the Bandung ethic, it
certainly aligns with the strong desire at Bandung to rein in the stronger states
to some degree and enhance Third World agency and global influence. It also
promotes the actualization of that ethic.
66 For example, the issue of controlling their resources and protecting them from colonial-era
style dispossession by stronger states has been framed as the peoples’ right to permanent
sovereignty over resources or the peoples’ right to economic self-determination. See Article 1,
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Article 1, International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; Article 21, African Charter. Note that although the
African Charter is not legally binding on any of the stronger states of the North that have
traditionally benefited from the exploitation of the resources of African peoples, the document
also functions as a formulation/statement of the ideology of human rights that African states
want to project to the world; i.e., their sense of what should and should not be included in the
list of human rights. The great concern of the Third World for improvements in their living
standards has also been framed as the right of peoples to development. See the UN Declaration
on the Right to Development, Dec. 4, 1986, A/RES/41/128; and Article 22, African Charter. See
also O.C. Okafor, “‘Righting’ the Right to Development: A Socio-Legal Analysis of Article 22 of
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights” in S. Marks (eds.), Implementing the
Right to Development: The Role of International Law (Geneva and Cambridge: Frederich
Ebert Stiftung and Harvard University, 2008).
67 For example, the concern of the weaker Third World states over the dumping of toxic waste
from the industrialized and more powerful states in the territories has been framed as a human
rights issue and placed squarely on the agenda of the UN Human Rights Council. See U.
Gwam, “Adverse Effects of Illicit Movement and Dumping of Toxic and Dangerous Products
and Wastes on the Enjoyment of Human Rights” 14 Florida Journal of International Law 427
(2002), p. 441. And colonialism was delegitimized by a General Assembly resolution. See the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, UNGA
Resolution 1514 (XV), Dec. 14, 1960. Importantly, and definitely not coincidentally, this
resolution was passed in the very same year in which the largest number of African states
gained their independence and became UN member states.
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Similarly, new methodologies and dramaturgies of international human
rights struggle have also augmented the capacity of Third World states, civil
society, and peoples to reshape our world. The significant success achieved by
global social movements in favor of human rights, in partnership with most of
the weaker Third World states and some other like-minded states, in recon-
structing the normative discourse and realities related to the relationship of
intellectual property rights and essential medicines (especially anti-HIV/AIDS
drugs), and in securing important concessions from the stronger developed
countries, is now very well known.68 The more recent example of the way in
which the Twitter hashtag “bringbackourgirls,” which was conceived by a
female Nigerian activist, “forced” many world powers to take some (albeit
extremely modest and inadequate) action to better support the efforts of the
Nigerian government to rescue about 200 kidnapped Nigerian school girls
further illustrates this point.69 Here, the Bandung ethic’s insistence on Third
World agency and on the need to discipline and constrain global power stands
vindicated in our time, howsoever modestly.
These are some illustrative examples of the discontinuities that characterize
international human rights practice from the perspective of its relationship to
the Bandung ethic; of the changes that have occurred since, and in part as a
result of, Bandung in the character or orientation of that practice, or in the
main list of tasks that it confronts.
conclusion
As we have seen, the set of Afro-Asian leaders who gathered at Bandung in
April 1955 in the shadows of global power were certainly quite diverse (though
not as diverse as the group of Third World leaders of our time). Yet, as diverse
as they were in political, social, and economic terms, they were nevertheless
inspired, animated, and later united (in large measure) by a set of common
concerns, aspirations, and stances. It was this relative commonality that
allowed the broad movement that they forged at Bandung to sire what later
became known as “the Third World,” and to, among other things, found its
nonaligned movement and G-77 expressions. It was also this relative common-
ality that allowed them and their countries to more or less unify in articulating
68 See J. Gathii, “Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health under the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties” 15 Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 291
(2002).
69 See BBC News (May 7, 2014), www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-27315124 (accessed July
4, 2014).
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and propagating what I refer to in this chapter as the Bandung ethic – one that
has continued to insist on global equality, Third World independence and
agency, Third World solidarity, and the betterment of the conditions of all
Third World peoples.
The task this chapter tackled was to assess whether in the sixty or so years
since the Bandung Conference, much has really changed in international
human rights practice when viewed from the perspective of the orientation of
the Bandung ethic and, and exactly to what extent. In any case, to what extent
is the Bandung ethic still relevant today? If formal colonialism is now over,
and international human rights practice has now been entirely and satisfactor-
ily transformed in line with the Bandung ethic, and that ethic’s job is now
done – why would it still be relevant in our time? In any case, whatever its
relevance today, is the Bandung spirit and the ethic it sired now dead? That
spirit/ethic has, of course, gone through ups and downs, and clearly the
landscape in which it operates is no longer exactly the same as it was at the
time of the Bandung Conference, but assertions of its decline have, in general,
been exaggerated. There is still a lot of work for the Bandung ethic to do today.
This is clearly evident from the map and analysis of the continuities and
discontinuities in the relationship of the Bandung ethic to international
human rights practice that this chapter has provided. At best, there are as
many continuities as there are discontinuities in this relationship. Global
power (including in its newer forms) continues till this day to exert a highly
significant on the character of international human rights practice and on its
orientation toward almost all of the Third World. Thus, if Amilcar Cabral was
correct in the 1970s that the anti-imperialist struggle “is for the building up of
our countries . . . a life of happiness, a life in which every [wo]man will have
the respect of all [wo]men, where discipline will not be imposed upon us . . . if
we do not achieve this, we will have failed in our duty, the objective of our
struggle,”70 then – in this sense at least – the anti-imperialist struggle is clearly
far from over. For, while imperialism today – including its workings in relation
to international human rights practice – is more ideational than bare-
knuckled, it still exerts very strong influence in today’s world. The power
relationships “furniture” in our global sitting room has been rearranged, but
we are still largely left with much the same kind of imperialist furniture.
This is a realization that is rendered acute when the story of international
human rights takes for its baseline and adopts as its chief referent an alternative
(largely) anti-imperialist moment like Bandung.
70 See Cabral, Unite et Lutte.
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